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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the corporate dividend policy in the Greek market. Assuming that managers 
are reluctant to make dividend changes that might have to be reversed, we test the hypothesis that 
corporate dividends are associated with past dividends, as well as the performance and the effec-
tive management of the firms.  The net income available to stockholders and the sales are em-
ployed as dummy variables that capture the performance and the effective management of the 
sampling firms respectively.   The estimations have been performed using panel data procedure 
for a sample of 149 Greek companies listed in the Athens Stock Exchange during 1996 – 2001. 
The empirical results support the hypothesis that companies distribute a dividend according to 
their performance their effective management and are not willing to change their dividend policy 
frequently. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
uring the last fifty years corporate finance researchers have embark on a considerable theoretical and 
empirical investigation on the factors that affect the level of the dividend that a firm is willing to pay. 
The cause of that concern is firstly that a company’s dividend decision has a direct impact on its 
financial mix and secondly that the magnitude of the dividend may affect the market value of the firm. At first, there 
is a trade-off between paying dividends and retaining the earnings within the firm.  Let us assume that the manage-
ment of a firm has already decided how much to invest and has chosen its debt-equity mix for financing these 
investments. The decision to pay a large dividend means simultaneously deciding to retain little, if any, earnings; 
this in turn results in a greater reliance on external equity financing.  Conversely, given the firm’s investment and  
financing decisions, a small dividend payment corresponds to high earnings retention with less need for externally 
generated equity funds.  On the other hand there are three basic views regarding the dividend payment’s effect on 
stock price. The first view implies that an increase in dividend payout has a positive impact on the value of the firm
1
; 
the second suggests that there exists a negative effect on the value of the company
2
 and the third that dividend policy 
has no influence on the total price of the firm
3
. However, the empirical research on that field has provided conflict-
ing results
4
.  In consequence, much work remains to be done before the academic finance community is able to offer 
definite guidance to corporate managers.   
 
In this paper we construct a model that formulates the dividend payout policy in the Greek market during 
the period 1996 – 2001. There have been only three attempts in the Greek finance literature to tackle this issue.  This 
work comprises an improvement on the third study and is conducted from the same researchers. Moreover, this 
article is the first one, which examines the possible link between dividend policy and the effective management of 
the firm, by employing pooling techniques and Greek panel data, over a recent period.    
                                                 
*  The authors would like to thank the participants at the European Applied Business Research Conference, held at Venice (Italy) on 9-13 June 
2003, for valuable comments and suggestions.   
1  See Gordon (1963), and Lintner (1962). 
2  See Lintzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979). 
3  See Miller and Modigliani (1961). 
4  For more information see Frankfurter and Wood, Jr. (2002), Allen and Michaely (1995), Barclay, Smith and Watts (1995), and Short, Zhang, 
and Keasey (2002). 
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The paper is organized as follows. A discussion of the empirical models and their results is provided in sec-
tion 2. Section 3 describes the data and the variables used.  Section 4 presents the model employed in the study. 
Section 5 reports the results of the empirical analysis. The paper finishes in section 6 with the conclusions. 
 
2.  Empirical Models Of Dividend Policy 
 
In the mid-1950s, John Lintner conducted a classic series of interviews with corporate managers about their 
dividend policies.  He started with over 600 listed firms and selected 28 for detailed investigation.  The criterion to 
reject the 572 companies was that all of them did not accomplish simultaneously all the alternative conditions that 
he sets. Lintner (1956) made a number of important observations concerning the dividend policies of these compa-
nies.  First, firms are primarily concerned with the stability of dividends.  Second, earnings were the most important 
determinant of any change in dividends.  Third, dividend policy was set first and other policies were then adjusted, 
taking dividend policy as given.   
 
Lintner model his findings by suggesting that each firm i has a target dividend payout ratio (r i). Then, the 
target dividend at time t, (Dit
*
), would be a proportion of the real earnings of the firm i at time t, (Eit); that is, 
 
Dit
*
= ri Eit
 
 
In real world the dividend, which the firm finally pays, at time t (Dit) differs from the target one (Dit
*
). Thus, 
it appears more reasonable to model the change between the actual dividend at time t and time t-1, instead of the 
actual dividend at time t only. Taking the change in actual dividends into account, it is realistic and consistent with 
the long-run target payout ratio, to assume that the change in actual dividend at time t (Dit - Di,t-1) is equal to a 
constant portion (αi) plus the speed with which the actual dividend, at time t-1, has adjusted to the target dividend at 
time t (Dit
*
 - Di,t-1); that is,  
 
 *, 1 , 1it i t i i it i tD D a c D D      
 
where ci indicates the fraction of the difference between the target dividend (Dit
*
) and the actual payment made in 
the preceding year (Di,t-1), which the firm will intend on the average to reflect in its current year’s dividend as an 
increase (or decrease) from the previous year’s payment. The constant αi will be zero for some firms but will 
generally be positive to reflect the greater reluctance to reduce than to raise dividends, and the influence of the 
desire of the most firms for a gradual growth in dividend payments. 
 
Since the target dividend at time t is a proportion of the real earnings at time t, the final model is as follows: 
 
 , 1 , 1 1it i t i i i it i i tD D a c r E c D      
 
where Dit is the actual dividend payment during period t, Eit is the earnings of the firm during period t, ci is the 
“speed of adjustment coefficient” (which indicates the speed with which the actual dividend, at time t-1, has 
adjusted to the target dividend at time t), and ri is the target payout ratio. This theoretical model can be estimated 
using the following econometric model: 
 
 1 2 , 1 2it i it i t itD a E D        
 
where ΔDit is the change in dividend from time t-1 to time t, for the firm i, β1 represents the product ci times ri of  the 
theoretical model, β2 expresses the variable ci of the theoretical model with negative sing (that is, β2 = - ci), and 
finally εit is the error of the model
5. Lintner’s estimation of the above model appeared fairly good, explaining 85% of 
the dividend changes in his sample of companies.   
                                                 
5  β1 = ci ri      ri = (β1 / ci)      ri = (- β1 / β2). 
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Fama and Babiak (1968) undertook a more comprehensive study of the Lintner model’s performance.  
Their starting point was the work of Lintner (1956). Their sample consists of 392 industrial firms over the period 
1946 through 1964. Fama and Babiak tested the Lintner’s model with their data and methodology and found that it 
performed well but it can be improved by introducing, as an additional explanatory variable, the earnings from the 
previous year without the constant term.  
 
An alternative behavioral justification often used in the literature to derive equation (2) is the adaptive ex-
pectations model
6
.  This model assumes that the dividend at time t is given by a proportion (κi) of the long-run 
expected earnings at time t (Eit
*
) plus a disturbance term (vit). 
 
*
it i it itD E v   
 
In addition, the model assumes that the change at t in long-run expected earnings (Eit
*
 - Ei,t-1
*
), can be ex-
pressed as a proportion (λi) of the change between the actual earnings at time t and the expected long-run earnings at 
time t-1 (Eit - Ei,t-1
*
); that is,  
 
 * * *, 1 , 1it i t i it i tE E E E     
 
But if the successive earnings changes are independent, the optimal value of λi is one (full adjustment). 
Thus, the final theoretical model suggests that the change in dividend (Dit - Di,t-1) is equal to a constant portion (αi) 
plus the proportion (κi) of the actual earnings (Eit) minus λi times the dividend at time t-1 (note that the optimal λ is 
one): 
 
, 1 , 1it i t i i it i t itD D a E D v       
 
However, Fama and Babiak (1968) claim that their estimations suggest that the adaptive expectations ap-
pears to be an inappropriate specification to their sample. 
 
There are only three studies conducted for the Greek market.  Patsouratis (1989) investigated empirically 
the Greek corporate dividend behavior employing analysis of covariance.  The basis of this research is the classic 
work of Brittain (1964).  His sample consists of 25 firms and covers the period 1974 – 1983.  Joannos and Filippas 
(1997) examined the dividend policy of 34 firms listed in the Athens Stock Exchange during the period 1972 – 1988. 
Their empirical results lead to the general conclusion that Lintner’s model best describes the dividend policy of the 
Greek firms.  Current profits constitute the most important variable that tends to influence the change in dividends 
while the previous period dividends tend to also significantly influence the change in the dividend policy of the 
firms. 
 
Vasiliou and Eriotis (2003) test the model of Lintner and suggest two different versions that improve the 
original model introduced by Lintner. In their first version of the Lintner’s model, they consider as dependent 
variable the change in dividend between time t and time t-1 and as independent variables the change in the earnings 
of the firm between time t and t-1 and the change in dividend between time t-1 and t-2: 
 
 1 2 , 1 3it i it i t itD a E D          
 
where Dit is the dividend of the firm i at time t, Eit is the net income of the firm i available to stockholders at time t, 
ΔDit (= Dit - Di,t-1) is the change between the dividend at time t and time t-1, for the firm i, ΔEit (= Eit - Ei,t-1) the 
change in the net income available to stockholders, at time t and time t-1, and εit is the error at time t. 
                                                 
6  For a discussion, see Brittain (1966), pp. 27-31. 
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The next empirical model that they test considers the same variables, dependent and independent, but this 
time without the changes between time t and t-1: 
 
 1 2 , 1 4it i it i t itD a E D       
 
The findings of Vasiliou and Eriotis (2003) suggest that the Greek firms follow a discrete dividend policy. 
That is, the dividend payout of a firm depends upon the firm’s long-run target dividend which is adjusted according 
to the net earnings of the firm. 
 
3.  Data And Variables 
 
Our empirical investigation about the determinants of dividend payout uses a sample of firms listed in the 
Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) market during the period 1996 – 2001. All the companies that included in the sample 
fulfill two basic criteria.  First, all of the firms were listed in the market in 1995. This criterion was imposed to 
ensure that dividend policy was not distorted by the effects of a recent official listing.  Second, none of the sample 
firms was expelled from the market during the period examined.  The sample was further reduced to 149 firms, as a 
result of missing data.  This number of firms corresponds to 63% of the listed companies on the Athens Stock 
Exchange in 1996.  
 
In order to examine empirically the dividend models discussed in the previous section, the key variables of 
interest are measures of dividends (D), earnings (E), and sales (S).  These variables were derived from data collected 
from the financial database of the Athens Stock Exchange.  Dividends (Di,t) are calculated as the total amount of 
dividends of the firm i at time t, and earnings (Ei,t) as the net income available to stockholders for the firm i at time t. 
 
Our sample consists of 149 firms in 5 year period (because of the employed change in the variables). That 
is a panel of data with 715 observations, as for some companies some data were missing. For the model which we 
consider the variables in lags the total panel includes 596 observations. 
 
4.  The Model 
 
The use of panel data models is a powerful research instrument, because it combines the cross-sectional da-
ta with time-series data, and provides results that could not be estimated and studied if we use only time-series or 
cross-section data. A general model for panel data that allows the researcher to estimate panel data with great 
flexibility and formulate the differences in the behavior of the cross-section elements is theoretically as follows
7
: 
 
it it it ity x z a      
 
where yit = is the dependent variable, xi = is the matrix with the independent variables, and zi = is a matrix 
which contains a constant term and a set of individual or group specific variables, which may be observed or 
unobserved.  This model is a classical regression model. If the matrix zi can be observed, for all individuals, then the 
least square method gives efficient and consistent estimators.  
 
The pooled regression considers that zi contains only a constant term. In this case the ordinary least square 
method provides an efficient and consistent estimate for the β and the α coefficients. If zi is unobserved and 
correlated with the independent variables then the least squares estimator of β is biased and inconsistent, as a 
consequence of an omitted variable. The fixed effects method takes those problems into account and gives an 
unbiased and consistent estimator of β and α. If the unobserved individual effects can be formulated, and under the 
assumption that these observations are uncorrelated with the independent variables, the econometric model can be 
estimated by the random effects method. 
                                                 
7  For more information see Greene (2003). 
International Business & Economics Research Journal Volume 3, Number 3 
 53 
The hypothesis that will be tested in this paper is that each year dividend depends upon the total perfor-
mance of the firm, the effective management and the dividend pattern that the firm followed in the past. In our view, 
the firm does not wish to change dramatically the value of the dividend that usually pays.  Given the last year 
dividend, the firm adjusts this year dividend in order to accomplice a long-run target dividend payout.  In conse-
quence, (Dit) is associated with the variable (Di,t-1). The net income available to stockholders (Eit), and the sales (Sit) 
are employed as dummy variables that capture the impact of the performance and the effective management on the 
dividend, respectively. Thus, we empirically estimate three versions of the theoretical model. 
 
The first model associates the change in dividend with the performance of the firm, the effective manage-
ment, and the dividend that the firm distributed last year; that is, 
 
 1 2 3 , 1 5it i it it i t itD a E S D          
 
where, Eit is the net income available to stockholders, for the firm i at time t, Sit is the total sales of the firm i at time t, 
Dit is the dividend of the firm i at time t, ΔDit (= Dit - Di,t-1) is the change in dividend of the firm i at time t, and eit is 
the error term of the model. 
 
The analysis of Vasiliou and Eriotis (2003) suggests that the model can be improved by the following two 
ways: 
 
 
 
1 2 , 1 3
1 2 3 , 1
6
7
it i it i t it it
it i it it i t it
D a E D S
and
D a E S D
   
   


        
    
 
 
where ΔEit = Eit - Ei,t-1, ΔDit = Dit - Di,t-1, and ΔSit = Sit - Si,t-1. 
 
5.  Empirical Results 
 
Tables 1 - 6 present the estimations of the econometric models (5), (6), and (7), respectively. At first, we 
estimate the equations (5) - (7) employing the total model.  In order to improve the performance of these estimations 
we also consider the fixed effects and the random effects model. As in Vasiliou and Eriotis (2003), the random 
effects model did not provide us with any significant results. That happens because the random effects model 
considers that the individual effects of each firm can be observed and formulated, an assumption that does not hold 
for our sample. The estimates with the fixed effects model proved to be the appropriate one. 
 
The results from the first model [equation (5)] for the Greek market, during the five-year period (total ob-
servations 715) with the total and the random effects models are presented in the tables 1 and 2, respectively. 
 
International Business & Economics Research Journal Volume 3, Number 3 
 54 
Table 1 
 
Model 
1 2 3 , 1it i it it i t itD a E S D          
Method Total (GLS, cross section weights) 
 Coefficient t – Stat. Prob. (t – Stat.) Stand. Error 
Constant -196696.3 -7.6688 0.0000 25648.78 
E 0.0872 14.8214 0.0000 0.0059 
S 0.01065 11.4901 0.0000 0.0009 
Dt-1 -0.3187 -13.3195 0.0000 0.0239 
R2 0.3332 
R2 adj. 0.3304 
F – Stat. 118.42 
S.E. 10,326,465 
GLS: Generalized Least Square 
S.E.    Square Error of the regression. 
 
The results from the Total model imply that the model explains the 33.32% of the changes in dividend from 
year to year.  The F-Statistic proves the validity of the estimated model.  In addition, all the coefficients are statisti-
cally significant in level of confidence 95%.  On the other hand, the fixed effects model gave the following results: 
 
 
Table 2 
 
Model 
1 2 3 , 1it i it it i t itD a E S D          
Method Fixed Effects (cross section weights) 
 Coefficient t – Stat. Prob. (t – Stat.) Stand. Error 
Constant - - - - 
E 0.1333 17.376 0.0000 0.0077 
S 0.0289 13.68 0.0000 0.0021 
Dt-1 -0.8163 -27.26 0.0000 0.0299 
R2 0.6863 
R2 adj. 0.6042 
F – Stat. 619.07 
S.E. 9,154,634 
GLS: Generalized Least Square 
S.E.    Square Error of the regression. 
 
 
The results from the fixed effects model improve our last estimation. This means that, there are individual 
or group effects, which cannot formulated, but must be taken into account. The improved estimation explains the 
68.6% of the changes in dividend from year to year. The F – Statistic proves the higher validity of this model 
compared to the last one. In addition, all the coefficients are statistically significant in level of confidence 95%.  
 
The decision to change the dividend depends positively on the effective management and the performance 
of the firm and negatively on the dividend that the firm distributed a year before. As the firm improves its perform-
ance and its management, it increases the dividend that it pays and vice versa. The negative sing in the dividend at 
time t-1 reveals the intention of the firm to stabilise the dividend that distributes. If an increase had occurred in last 
year’s dividend payment which implies that an increase might had appeared in last year’s dividend change, then a 
decrease in this year dividend change should be expected, in order to “smooth” dividends. 
 
Tables (3) and (4) present the empirical results from the model (6). Because we had to estimate all the vari-
ables in changes as well as a variable in one lag (ΔDt-1), the total number of observations decreased to 596. 
 
International Business & Economics Research Journal Volume 3, Number 3 
 55 
Table 3 
 
Model 
1 2 3 , 1it i it it i t itD a E S D             
Method Total (GLS, cross section weights) 
 Coefficient t – Stat. Prob. (t – Stat.) Stand. Error 
Constant 88,759.10 2.96 0.0032 2,9626 
ΔE 0.1270 15.19 0.0000 0.0084 
ΔS 0.0280 9.41 0.0000 0.0030 
Dt-1 -0.1625 -4.86 0.0000 0.0334 
R2 0.4049 
R2 adj. 0.4019 
F – Stat. 134.29 
S.E. 9,771,148 
GLS: Generalized Least Square 
S.E.    Square Error of the regression. 
 
 
Table 4 
 
Model 
1 2 3 , 1it i it it i t itD a E S D             
Method Fixed Effects (GLS, cross section weights) 
 Coefficient t – Stat. Prob. (t – Stat.) Stand. Error 
Constant - - - - 
ΔΕ 0.1020 14.40 0.0000 0.0070 
ΔS 0.0219 10.72 0.0000 0.0020 
ΔDt-1 -0.4058 -10.74 0.0000 0.0377 
R2 0.6352 
R2 adj. 0.5112 
F – Stat. 386.69 
S.E. 13,033,461 
GLS: Generalized Least Square 
S.E.    Square Error of the regression. 
 
 
The results from the Total model indicate that our model (6) explains the 40.5% of the changes in dividend. 
The F – Statistic proves the significance of the estimated model. In addition, all the coefficients are statistically 
significant at 95% level of confidence. The estimation of the model without the constant term provides less satisfac-
tory results with adjusted R
2
 around 38%.  
 
The estimation with the fixed effects model improved our results. The explanatory power of the fixed ef-
fects model increased from 40.5% to 63.5%. In both models, the sings of all the estimated coefficients remained the 
same. The decision to change the dividend at time t is positively related with the change in the performance of the 
firm as well as the change in the effective management and negatively with the change in dividend of the previous 
year. As in the previous estimation of the model [equation (5)], the negative sing in the coefficient of the (ΔDt) 
reflects the adjustment of the firm’s dividend in the long-run target dividend. The expected positive sign in the 
coefficients of (ΔEt) and (ΔSt) confirmed by the data, which express the intention of the firm to adjust the dividend 
according to its overall performance.  
 
The regression of the model with all the variables, dependent and independent, in values [i.e. equation (7)] 
is presented in the following two tables (5 and 6). 
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Table 5 
 
Model 
, 1 2 3 , 1i t i it it i t itD E S D          
Method Total Model (PLS) 
 Coefficient t – Stat. Prob. (t – Stat.) Stand. Error 
Constant -602,874.1 -1.27 0.2040 474,180.4 
E 0.1056 11.97 0.0000 0.0088 
S 0.0199 10.48 0.0000 0.0019 
Dt-1 0.6197 28.19 0.0000 0.0220 
R2 0.9011 
R2 adj. 0.9007 
F – Stat. 2,159.57 
S.E. 12,132,278 
PLS: Pooled Least Square 
S.E.   Square Error of the regression. 
 
 
The results from the Total model indicate that this version of the model has the greater explanatory power 
among the three with R
2
 equals to 90.09%. The high F – Statistic proves the validity of the model. In addition, all 
the coefficients are statistically significant in level of confidence 95%.  
 
 
Table 6 
 
Model 
1 2 3 , 1it i it i t itD E S D          
Method Fixed Effects (cross section weights) 
 Coefficient t – Stat. Prob. (t – Stat.) Stand. Error 
Constant - - - - 
E 0.1333 17.37 0.0000 0.0077 
S 0.0289 13.68 0.0000 0.0021 
Dt-1 0.1836 6.13 0.0000 0.0299 
R2 0.9550 
R2 adj. 0.9433 
F – Stat. 6,016.20 
S.E. 9,157,131 
GLS: Generalized Least Square 
S.E.    Square Error of the regression. 
 
 
The results from the fixed effects model improved, as we were expected, the explanatory power from 90% 
to 95.5% and the F – Statistic appears even better. In addition, all the coefficients are statistically significant in level 
of confidence 95%. 
 
In both estimations, with the total and the fixed effects models, all the sings of the independent variables 
remained positive. The positive effect from the performance and the effective management of the firm indicate that 
the firm adjusts the dividend accordingly. As the performance and the effective management of the firm improve, 
the dividend increases as well. On the other hand the positive sign in dividend supports the hypothesis that firms are 
not willing to change their dividend policy from year to year. An increase in last year’s dividend appears to have a 
positive impact on this year’s dividend. The above tables seem to provide evidence that the Greek firms follow a 
discrete dividend policy.  Their dividend payout depends upon their long-run target dividend which is adjusted 
according to their earnings and their sales. 
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6.  Conclusions 
 
The examination of the factors that affect the dividend policy of a firm has always been one of the major 
topics in the corporate finance research. In this paper we consider a model that associates the corporate dividend 
policy with a long-run target dividend, which is adjusted according to the performance and the effective manage-
ment of the firm. The empirical results of the model explain the 95.5% of the distributed dividend of the sampling 
firms from the Greek market during 1996 – 2001. In addition our results reveal that the firms have no intension to 
change their dividend policy frequently. This final result is consistent with the Lintner’s empirical evidence where 
the managers appear to believe that the market puts a premium on firms with stable dividend payout policy. 
 
7.  Suggestions For Future Research 
 
This paper confirms that corporate dividends are associated with past dividends, as well as the net income 
available to stockholders and the sales of the firms.  Several interesting extensions of this work are possible.  First, 
the dividend yield could be used as a depended variable, instead of the total corporate dividends.  In addition, one 
could test whether there is a link between dividend policy and corporate leverage.   
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